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Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100410009-7

The RAND Corporation

1700 MAIN STREET, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA • CALIFORNIA 2-2333

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Instructions on File

Dr. Ivan Selsin
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Strategic Programs
Office, Assistant Secretary,
Systems Analysis
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Ivan:

(C) Attached is the final version of the Consultants' report. It is based upon the material presented at the study group's meetings and the Consultants' views as to typical decisionmaking processes in large organizations. It speculates about the probable nature of decision-making process within the Soviet military bureaucracy, and discusses the possibilities of influencing the evolution of Soviet military force posture through U.S. action. All the Consultants hope the report and its various attachments will be of some use to you. We have pushed our ideas concerning the typical behavior of large organizations as they can be applied to the Soviet military establishment about as far as we can go at the present.

(C) One conclusion of the Consultants which may not come through clearly enough in the final report: we are convinced that the application of currently available knowledge concerning the behavior of large organizations to a variety of intelligence problems should be pursued. I hope to arrange a meeting with people in the Intelligence community to present the views of the Consultants, and to discuss some ideas about how to overcome some of the problems of applying these ideas.

(U) Some of the Intelligence people, I know, are skeptical about the possibility of applying the type of analysis we have suggested to the Soviet Union because of the scarcity of data. But I am not sure that the kind of analysis we are suggesting is any more data-intensive than others. Moreover, our position would be that when data is very scarce and spotty the analytical framework, the theories, and generalizations required to fill in the holes in the analysis become more important. The best way, we think, to fill in these holes is on the basis of the currently available knowledge concerning typical behavior of large organizations.

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Dr. Evan Selin

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L-19543
14 August 1968

(C) I call your attention to two of the recommendations: First, the recommendation that you undertake to organize a seminar within Systems Analysis to sensitize systems analysts to the probable complexity of the Soviet-U.S. interaction process, and some of its organizationally determined features. I hope that reading the report will be of some use to you in this connection. One of the reasons that some of the attachments are appended to it is that they supply useful reading material to people unacquainted with work on organizational behavior. There is a good deal of additional literature that can be of use to you. The Consultants will assist you in setting up and running the seminar in any way they can. ✓

(S) Second, the recommendation that you request the Intelligence Community to conduct a study of some issue, or part of the Soviet military organization, of special interest or concern to you. The study to focus upon the behavior of relevant parts of the Soviet military establishment, and proceed as far as is possible in relating behavior to organizational factors. During the work of the study group, the Consultants came to feel that the most fruitful follow-on to the current effort would be a longer-term, systematic effort on the part of the Intelligence Community to gather together existing information and apply it to the analysis of some specific intelligence problem. The Consultants are willing to be of help in any way that they can, in formulating such a study and throughout its course. ✓

(U) I also call your attention to the suggestions on managing the interaction process and the conduct of negotiations with the Soviets on pages 20 and 21. They may be of some use to you, at the moment.

(U) Finally, the Consultants would like you to convey their thanks to the representatives of the Intelligence Community who were so helpful during the work of the study group. I have thoroughly enjoyed myself doing this work for you. I will see you again in Washington in a few weeks. //

Sincerely,

A. W. Marshall
Economics Department

AWM:dc

Encl - "Organizational Behavior of the Soviet Military Bureaucracy(U)",
by J.L. Bower, C.R. Christensen, J.G. March, and A. W. Marshall,
dated August 14, 1968 (SECRET), 3 copies.

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ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S):

No Attachment